The Russian GKO default crisis provides a unique window into the impact of changing default probabilities and recovery ratio assumptions on credit-sensitive sovereign bond prices. This paper introduces a joint implied parameter approach to extract both the expected recovery ratio and the default probability term structure. The methodology is applied to both Russian Federation and Republic of Argentina US dollar-denominated Eurobonds before and after the GKO crisis. For the Russian bonds, the sample paths suggest a two-phase revaluation. Shifts in default probabilities account for most of the initial price collapse. Marked decreases in the projected default recovery ratio dominate the continued Russian bond price declines. The "contagion effect" impact of the default crisis on the Argentine Eurobond market actually resembles the Russian case much more than the raw price data indicate. The crucial Argentine distinction is that investors never cut recovery value assumptions.
Introduction
Russia's August 1998 default on its ruble-denominated GKO debt obligations precipitated a severe revaluation of credit risk throughout the global financial markets. 1 This default was extraordinary, and punished investors who had assumed that a government with access to the monetary printing press would always honor its home currency obligations.
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Of course, investors have always imputed default risk to foreign currency sovereign debt, especially for emerging market issuers. Echoing this point, the ratings agencies afford less-than-AAA status for many such sovereign bonds. As of year-end 1998, Standard & Poor's rated Russia's US dollar-denominated debt BBB and similar Argentine debt BB. The yield premiums over US Treasury yields demanded for foreign issuers' US dollar-denominated debt compensate the holders for bearing default risks.
Such yield premiums fluctuated wildly during the Russian GKO default crisis as default scenario contagion spread to the markets for emerging market countries' dollardenominated debt.
While the extreme price volatility generated by the Russian crisis was painful to many investors, it provides a unique window into the impact of changing default probabilities and recovery ratio assumptions on credit-sensitive sovereign bond prices. This paper introduces a joint implied parameter approach to sovereign bond pricing to extract market assumptions about both the expected recovery ratio and the default probability term structure by applying a consistent valuation framework to a cross-section of market prices on outstanding bond issues. Previous empirical analyses of U.S.
corporate bond pricing such as Fons (1987) and Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) exogenously specify default recovery rate parameters based upon previous careful studies of U.S. historical default experience. In the emerging sovereign debt markets, no such recovery histories based upon previous defaults are available for reference. Moreover, sovereign default crises are necessarily fluid situations generating possibly major revisions in investor expectations. This paper's empirical section applies the methodology to both Russian Federation (the catalyst country) and Republic of Argentina (a contagion-effect country) US dollardenominated Eurobonds during the GKO crisis. The empirical strategy aims to answer a sequence of outstanding questions to fully understand the price dynamics of the emerging markets debt crash. First, what were the market's initial recovery rate assumptions on these Russian and Argentine Eurobonds? Second, in both of these markets, what implied default rate term structures did the cross-section of prices initially reflect? Third, how did these assumed recovery ratio and default rate term structure parameters change throughout the GKO default crisis? Finally, did shifts in expected recovery values distort observations of default rate contagion effects?
The implied recovery ratio approach is particularly useful for these Russian and Argentine applications. Far from being a typical default, this home-currency Russian GKO bond default catalyzed a global review of credit risks. Of course, the most direct impact of such a watershed event would be on other classes of Russian debt. Moreover, unlike Brady Bonds, Russian Federation Eurobonds carry no attached collateral. By scrutinizing market reactions via the price fluctuations on the five outstanding Russian Eurobond issues during the crisis, the analysis can trace the path of revisions to market expectations regarding both the recovery ratio and Eurobond default probabilities. Argentina's Eurobond issues also suffered severely from the revaluing of credit risks, but subsequently recovered most of their losses. A comparative analysis of the Argentine bond price data gives a broader context for recovery ratio assumptions. The Argentine analysis also permits a direct characterization of default crisis contagion effects.
The empirical analysis leads to the following conclusions: First, the pre-crisis implied recovery ratio for Russian Eurobonds is lower than the level that previous researchers have estimated for US corporate debt. In contrast, Argentina's debt embodies standard US corporate debt recovery ratio assumptions. Second, during the crisis, the implied default probability on Russian debt rose sharply during the week prior to the GKO default announcement and then rose again afterwards. Third, the implied Russian recovery ratio -reasonably stable prior to the GKO default -fell sharply upon the actual default announcement. Fourth, significant downward revisions in this implied recovery ratio continued even after the default probability stabilized at its higher value. For the post-GKO default announcement sample period, market prices imply an average recovery value for Russian Eurobonds of only ten cents on the dollar. Finally, because of the divergence between recovery value shifts during this sample period, bond price comparisons alone understate the depth of the default contagion effect on Argentina.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the recovery value concept and details the pricing framework. The framework incorporates a discounted expected cash flow methodology utilizing the now familiar equivalent martingale technique. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 discusses the estimation strategy. Section 5 presents results for the Russian Federation Eurobonds. Section 6 presents the results for the Republic of Argentina Eurobonds. Section 7 discusses contagion crisis depth. Section 8 concludes.
A Pricing Framework
In principal, risky sovereign debt valuation should proceed along lines similar to valuation for risky corporate debt. Except for Brady Bonds (see below), the sovereign debt default event is couched under a forced "rescheduling" agreement that exchanges the originally promised cash flow stream for new, more lenient terms. From the investor's perspective, the value of the involuntarily-exchanged new security is less than that of the original debt. In a sovereign default, as the Russian GKO exchange package negotiations showed, power -not the issuer's actual ability to pay -may be the most important determinant of whatever value the investor may recover.
As with risky corporate debt, assumptions about the default recovery ratio -the percentage of bond par value recovered by the investor after a default -crucially affect sovereign foreign currency debt valuation. For different classes of US corporate debt, investors can utilize a well-documented default experience history to help predict potential default recovery rates. For example, Altman and Eberhart (1994) examine a sample of 91 US firms that filed for and emerged from Chapter 11 between 1980 and 1992. The authors estimate bondholder recovery by actual post-emergence bond market value. The sample's average recovery rate is about 50%, with significant differences among seniority classes. Using a much larger sample over the 1978-1998 period, Altman et al (1999) estimate the weighted average recovery rate of US corporate debt defaults to be 40% of face value.
Unlike the US domestic corporate debt markets, the sovereign foreign currency bond markets offer no rich default experience histories for reference. A large portion of such debt exists under the Brady Bond structure, where repayment of principal and a rolling component of the coupon stream is secured by zero-coupon US Treasury Note collateral. Through the Treasury collateral, the Brady Bond structure ameliorates the investor's problem of reliably estimating a default recovery ratio. 3 In the absence of such Brady Bond guarantees, a default crisis scenario for unsecured sovereign debt is destined to be a fluid situation.
There are four components in the valuation methodology for a specific N-period maturity bond. The first is the bond's notional (i.e., promised) cash flow stream consisting of coupons and principal value. Denote the date t coupon payment by C t and the maturity date N principal repayment by F N . The second component is an assumed specific salvage or recovery value, R, paid to the bondholder immediately upon the event of default. In the default portion of the event tree, this immediate substituting payment of R replaces any remaining cash flows (i.e., the remaining coupons and principal) from the initially promised stream. This recovery value represents the default date present value of the bond's payment rescheduling. The third component is the adjusted risk-neutral payments probability distribution under the equivalent martingale measure of Harrison and Kreps (1979) . Denote the (adjusted) probability of default during the specific date t-1 to date t period as p t . Denote the (adjusted) probability of a timely payment of the promised date t cash flow as P t . Since each coupon payment has a "cross-default" provision with every subsequent coupon, P t represents the cumulative probability of no default occurring from issue date through date t. 4 Thus, the effect of recovery value is spread out across the event tree. The fourth valuation component is the risk-free present value discount factor for a time t cash flow, denoted as f t .
Equation (1) expresses the bond's current value, V 0, as the expected discounted cash flow relation:
( 1) t=1 t=1 As in Jonkhart (1979) and Fons (1987) , equation (1) views the bond's current value as a probability-weighted sum of three components: coupon flows, principal repayment and recovery value. However, following Leland and Toft (1996) , the probability distribution used here is reinterpreted as the implied risk-neutral distribution.
Finally, cross-default provisions with other coupon-paying bonds may also exist.
In this case, recovery value realization on a particular bond may occur even on a date where no coupon payment is scheduled. Careful treatment of recovery value as a separate flow component involves analyzing the specific institutional cross-default framework.
Denote the date t term risk-neutral default probability rate as δ t . The probability of timely payment of a future date t cash flow follows as:
Previous empirical research on expressions such as equation (1) by Fons (1987) and Bhanot (1998) consider only a constant probability of default (δ t = δ). Here, assume instead that the term default rate applying for a period t cash flow can be expressed as a linear function of time:
where the parameters α and β are restricted to values ensuring that P t is less than or equal to unity for all t. A flat default rate term structure (β = 0; δ t = α) would imply identical forward default rates for all periods. During a crisis, default rates for deferred periodswhich apply to default probabilities in future periods conditional on the sovereign's ability to successfully avoid an earlier default -might be lower than near-term default rates.
Equation (3) attempts to improve upon the specifications of previous research to capture such a default rate curve in a parsimonious manner.
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In sum, the framework incorporates three unknown parameters: R, α and β. The risk-free discount factors and the bond's notional cash flows are known. Since p t = (P t-1 -P t ), equation (4) embodies an estimable form of the bond valuation expression. 
The Data
As of year-end 1998, the Russian Federation had five bullet US dollardenominated Eurobond issues outstanding: the 9.25% 11/27/01 (Russia-01); the 11.75
6/10/03 (Russia-03); the 8.75% 7/24/05 (Russia-05); the 10% 6/26/07 (Russia-07); and the 11% 7/24/18 (Russia-18). 6 Thus, from the inception of the GKO crisis, the five bonds' maturity spectrum spanned between two and twenty years. The total par value of all of Russia's Eurobond issues is approximately $13.7 billion. These bonds are the unsecured debt obligations of the Russian Federation and are governed by the laws of England. Each bond's cross-default provision is triggered should the Russian Federation default on any of its other Eurobonds or other public external indebtedness.
For the same period, the Republic of Argentina also had five bullet US dollardenominated Eurobond issues outstanding: the 9.25% 2/23/01 (Arg-01); the 8.375
12/20/03 (Arg-03); the 11% 10/9/06 (Arg-06); the 11.375% 1/30/17 (Arg-17); and the 9.75% 9/19/27 (Arg-27). Thus, from the inception of the GKO crisis, the five Argentine bonds' maturity spectrum spanned between two and thirty years. The total par value of all of these fixed-rate Argentine Eurobond issues is approximately $11.5 billion. These bonds are the unsecured debt obligations of the Republic of Argentina and are governed by the laws of England.
The bonds of both issuers trade in an over-the-counter dealer market. As might be anticipated, the August crisis triggered important changes in the structure of the Russian market. Prior to August, about twenty firms acted as market-makers, though only about ten could be relied upon to supply liquidity on a consistent basis. In the aftermath of the crisis, only about one-half of these firms continued to participate as dealers. estimates α, β and R into equation (4). Now, at date 0, consider a cross-section of I outstanding issues indexed by the subscript i with a common cross-default provision.
Define the sum of squared residuals across the I outstanding issues on date 0 as 
i =1
.
Implementing the strategy requires the following steps. For each day in the sample, construct the cash flow event tree for each of the I bonds. 8 Next, apply equation (4) representing each bond's value as the sum of its discounted probability-weighted cash flows. Finally, using initial guesses for the unknown parameters R, α, and β, search for the values that minimize that day's sum of squared cross-sectional bond pricing residuals while setting the cross-sectional average error to zero.
Parameter estimates are computed using an algorithm for nonlinear optimization subject to nonlinear constraints. 9 The convergence algorithm does not guarantee that the final estimates are global solutions. This is a general problem with search algorithms in nonlinear optimization. Some experimentation with alternative initial guesses showed that starting points generally did not make a crucial difference to the estimation results. Of course, another index to the credibility of an estimation procedure is the reasonableness of its results. These are presented below. Table 2 reports summary statistics for the Russian market's time series of daily parameter estimates over the full sample. The average implied recovery ratio for these Russian bonds was estimated at 13.1%, significantly lower than the 40%-50% ex post ratios cited above for US corporate defaults. The average default rate term structure parameters -base rate of 0.37; slope of .0176 per year -implied average payment probabilities of 36% for a 2-year-ahead date; 5% for a 5-year date; and 0% for a 10-year date. All three model parameter series exhibited substantial daily variation. Table 3 reports similar Russian market results for two sub-samples partitioned into pre-August 17, 1998 and post-August 17 periods. As might be anticipated, there are large differences in the default rate term structure parameter estimates across the two subsamples. The average post-announcement base default rate more than doubled its preannouncement level (from .17 to .41). In both sub-samples, the estimate slope coefficient was positive. However, the correlation between the default function intercept and slope parameters was negative.
Results for Russian Federation Eurobonds
Unlike the case of the default rate parameters, a stylized credit crisis need not predict shifts in the implied default recovery ratio. A default recovery ratio only takes on meaning conditional upon the occurrence of the default event. Its value could be independent of changes in the probability that the event occurs, unless relevant news is changing both simultaneously. Thus, there is no theoretical reason why the implied recovery rate need change in a crisis. However, the Table 3 estimates clearly show that a dramatic fall did occur in the post-announcement sub-sample. The pre-announcement average recovery ratio estimate was 27.3%. Thus, even the pre-crisis Russian recovery value estimate is lower than the 40%-50% average historical levels cited above for US corporate ex post default recovery experience. For the post-announcement period, the implied recovery ratio estimate was 10.4%. In Russia's case, the rise in default probability was accompanied by a significant downward revision in assumed recovery value. revisions by comparing the Russia-18's model price at the estimated recovery ratio against a counterfactual simulated Russia-18 price. The point of this exercise is to show how much market revisions to recovery value mattered during the crisis: to quantify recovery revaluation effects on prices as distinct from default probability revision effects. Table 3 computes its counterfactual simulated price by applying the sample estimates for α and β, but only after keeping the recovery ratio parameter fixed at 25% throughout the sample (R=$25 per $100 of par value). The gap between the true and counterfactual prices increases as the implied recovery ratio falls. Indeed, the post-GKO default announcement sample's average difference was about 13.5 price points. The largest difference occurred on October 14 th , when the gap rose to 21.9 price points. The period between August 18 th and October 15 th was particularly interesting. The implied payment probability prospects actually brightened -α in Figure 2 decreased and the counterfactual R = 25 price in Figure 3 rose -while market bond prices continue to fall significantly.
<Insert Figure 3 here> Table 5 reports similar Republic of Argentina Eurobond market results for the two sub-samples partitioned into pre-August 17, 1998 and post-August 17 periods. As with the Russian market data, there were large differences in the default rate term structure parameter estimates across the two sub-samples. The average post-announcement base default rate quadrupled its pre-announcement level (to .148 from .034). And as with Russia, while the estimate slope coefficient was positive in both sub-samples, the correlation between the default function intercept and slope parameters was negative. Table 5 also reports test statistics for the null hypothesis that the Argentine
Results for Republic of Argentina Eurobonds
Eurobond recovery ratio and the default rate function parameters were constant across the August 17 th break point. In contrast to the results for Russian bonds, the constant recovery ratio hypothesis cannot be rejected. Nevertheless, the hypotheses of constant default rate function parameters -both intercept and slope -can be rejected at standard levels of significance. Figure 4 plots the daily estimates of the implied recovery ratio (R) and the default rate function's intercept coefficient (α) for these Republic of Argentina Eurobonds.
<Insert Tables 4 and 5 
Crisis Depth
Perceived gains from diversifying an emerging market investment allocation across a wide set of different country credits depend on the correlations among country bond markets. If asset correlations tend to rise in times of crisis, much of the originally perceived benefits from diversification is negated. In the emerging fixed income markets, the rising correlations during credit crises are termed "contagion effects." An increase in the implied probability of default of one sovereign issuer's debt (e.g., Russia) causes corresponding implied default probability increases for others (e.g., Argentina) as emerging market investors simultaneously rush to shrink their portfolio exposures.
But in the current context, interpreting even the most basic data concerning the relative depths of the GKO default crisis among different emerging markets is problematic.
As depicted in Figure 1 , while Argentine Eurobond prices followed Russian bond prices down from mid-August to mid-September, the crash in Argentine bond prices was significantly less severe.
Yet, a very different picture of the relative depths of the crisis appears in Figure 5 .
This figure plots the estimated payment probability for a 5-year horizon cash flow date in each market. The implied five-year Argentine payment probability began August at 75%.
It collapsed to an average of 21% for the first-half of September. Thus, the true default crisis in the Argentine market actually resembled Russia much more than the raw price data indicates. Default crisis contagion effects from Russian to Argentine Eurobonds were extremely strong. The crucial distinction between the two bond markets is that investor perception of the Argentine recovery value floor never buckled. In contrast, recovery value under a Russian default was essentially written off. The lesson for Argentina:
default crisis contagion effects are very real. What saved the Argentine market from a more severe crash was ongoing investor confidence in being treated fairly under a potential default scenario.
Conclusions
The results here support the hypothesis that significant downward revisions in the market's assessment of default recovery ratios played a significant roll in the 1998 crash of Russian Federation Eurobond prices. What caused these substantial downward revisions?
The most likely factor was the unveiling of the first Russian government proposals for restructuring the defaulted ruble-denominated GKO debt. These first proposals, released the week after the default, lacked clear details on the pricing of a proposed ruble-intodollar debt swap. The details regarding possible trading restrictions on either the new ruble or new dollar security alternatives were also sketchy. More clarity about the situation did not appear until early December 1998. Major international banks deemed the initial plan -along with several revisions -unacceptable. However, one conclusion was clear: investors would fare worse than they had originally anticipated. This GKO outcome most certainly influenced the continued price declines in the Russian Eurobond market.
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